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The "liberalization" of Rule 231 in 1966 brought great hope to those
who saw the class action as the answer to a broad range of marketplace
abuses.2 Twenty years later, many of these expectations have not been
met. In particular, for the large consumer class seeking to adjudicate small
individual claims,3 the class action has proved to be an imperfect and
sometimes unworkable device."
Consumer class actions raising small individual claims are often de-
railed at one of three stages. First, the action may fail through noncertifi-
cation.5 Courts are wary of certifying a class as manageable' when the
I. Fm)n. R. Civ. P. 23.
2. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375 (1972); see
also State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 471, 715 P.2d 564, 570, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 611
(1986) ("[Tlhe consumer class action is an essential tool for the protection of consumers against ex-
ploitative business practices.").
3. "Small individual claim" is a relative term. It refers not to any absolute amount, but rather to
the value of the claim to the claimant. Thus, it approximates the actual amount of the claim minus
the costs of prosecuting it. These costs include the administrative expense incurred by the justice
system in adjudicating and processing the claim (since this expense is eventually deducted), and the
personal costs to the claimant (in terms of time, energy, aggravation, and out-of-pocket expenses,
including legal fees, if any) necessary to prosecute the claim. This expected value of the claim limits
the utility to the claimant of prosecuting it.
4. For an excellent example, see In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974), a class
action on behalf of 40 million consumers alleging a conspiracy to inflate hotel charges by imposing a
separate fee for telephones. Damages averaged only two dollars per class member. The court refused
to certify the class, citing administrative costs and lengthy individual proof of claim proceedings: "In a
class of forty million, assuming only ten percent of these unknown class members came forward with
claims, and assuming the proof of each claim required only ten minutes, approximately one hundred
years would yet be required to adjudicate the claims." Id. at 89. The hotel owners retained the
approximately S80 million in alleged overcharges. Id. at 88.
5. For a discussion of the prerequisites for maintaining a class action under Rule 23, see I H.
N-:wBnR;, CLASs A:ri'IONS § 3 (2d ed. 1985).
6. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(D), 23(c)(1).
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sheer size7-and often the anonymity-of the plaintiff class effectively
prevents proof of damages and compensation on an individual basis.8
Daunted, courts sometimes decline to certify the class,9 and, with individ-
ual claims too small to pursue piecemeal, the defrauder ends up keeping
the loot.
A second type of failure occurs after judgment. When courts allow the
action to proceed beyond certification, the problem is merely delayed, not
solved. Following a judgment in favor of plaintiffs, class members must
come forward to present individual proofs of claim. However, even when
the aggregate damages are enormous, each individual claim may be too
small" to be worth the effort for class members to come forward.11 Again,
the result is frustration of these consumer claims, with unclaimed portions
of the recovery fund remaining in the hands of the defendant.12
The third problem arises at the settlement stage. The large majority of
consumer class actions are settled before trial.1 Settlement negotiations
are dominated by predictions of how many class members can be expected
to present proofs of claim. 4 Because only a very small number of eligible
7. Very large plaintiff classes are relatively common in consumer class actions. See, e.g., In re
Memorex Sec. Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (SEC violations alleged by 60,000 class
members); Zachary v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 52 F.R.D. 532, 534 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (consumer
credit case involving more than one million class members); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D.
253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Sherman Act violation alleged by six million plaintiffs), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156, 166 (1974); Bruno v. Superior
Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 123, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 343 (1981) (milk price fixing alleged by I to
1.5 million consumers).
8. Often, extraordinary measures-such as advertising in the mass media, employing professional
locator services, hiring staff, and appointing special masters-can be devised, but only at a cost dispro-
portionate to the size of each individual claim, vastly diminishing the efficacy of any recovery.
9. See, e.g., Ralston v. Volkswagenwerk, 61 F.R.D. 427, 428 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (18,000 automo-
bile purchasers charged price fixing on Volkswagens); Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D.
45, 72-74 (D.N.J. 1971) (six million consumers alleged gasoline price fixing); Cicelski v. Sears, Roe-
buck & Co., 132 Mich. App. 298, 304, 348 N.W.2d 685, 689 (1984) (approximately one million
consumers claimed miscalculation of department store finance charges).
10. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 88 (9th Cir. 1974) (forty million plaintiffs
with average claim of two dollars each); Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, 546 F. Supp.
1, 10-11 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (1.1 million class members with estimated maximum damages of S3.83 to
$6.77 each); Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 Mich. App. at 303, 348 N.W.2d at 688-89
(maximum average individual claim of $4.50 out of aggregate class-wide damages of SI million).
11. Even when consumers are willing to come forward, in many cases they will be unable to
prove their claims, having long since discarded receipts, records, or even the purchased item itself. Of
course, when the consumer is certain that he or she made the purchase, courts may accept a sworn
affidavit in lieu of documentation. However, without documentation or the item itself, consumers may
not remember whether the purchase was made, when it was made, or how many items were
purchased.
12. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1939) (defendant
entitled to keep $1.69 million of damage fund that could not be refunded to class members).
13. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 11.14.
14. Telephone interview with Beverly C. Moore, Jr., Editor of Class Action Reports (Nov. 7,
1985). The number of class members expected to present proofs of claim, multiplied by the average
claim, determines the maximum possible loss a defendant can sustain at judgment. Therefore, this
number also determines the maximum amount a defendant will pay in settlement, since no defendant
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class members ever come forward, plaintiffs are forced to settle for a frac-
tion of the damages they claim-five cents on the dollar is typical.15 Thus,
even when a class is certified, the requirement that individuals prove dam-
ages in mass consumer class actions may have the practical effect of fore-
closing recovery on a large portion of the class's damages. As a result, the
offending party profits.
To correct these inequities, courts should weigh the manageability of
small claim consumer class actions against the goals of disgorgement and
deterrence, 6 instead of against the traditional goal of compensation.
Judges should then fashion remedies to satisfy these goals;' 7 while these
remedies may not provide full direct compensation to plaintiffs, they can
force guilty defendants to disgorge ill-gotten gains, and deter them from
similar future conduct."8 To do this, courts should: (1) decline to require
individual proofs of claim in cases where the aggregate class-wide dam-
ages can be calculated; and (2) utilize the doctrine of cy pres'9 to dis-
tribute the recovery fund in a class-wide fashion. A cy pres mechanism
that is particularly well-suited to small claim consumer class actions is the
equitable trust.
This Note argues for legislative and judicial action to expand the use of
equitable trusts. Section I presents three goals for small claim consumer
class actions that justify the use of cy pres recoveries. Section II suggests
criteria for evaluating different cy pres distributions and finds the common
cy pres options inadequate. Section III discusses the structure and applica-
tion of equitable trusts, as well as the potential for expanding their use.
Section IV offers guidelines for legislative action to direct the courts' exer-
cise of the equitable trust remedy.
will settle a case for more than it expects to lose at trial. (This does not take into account lawyers' fees
and court costs, which would, of course, increase defendants' potential losses at trial.)
15. Id.
16. See infra Section I.B.
17. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 610, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, 144 (courts must fashion consumer class action remedies to meet changing needs of society), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
18. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472, 715 P.2d 564, 570-71, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605,
611-12 (1986) ("Fluid recovery may be essential to ensure that the policies of disgorgement or deter-
rence are realized. Without fluid recovery, defendants may be permitted to retain ill-gotten gains
simply because their conduct harmed large numbers of people in small amounts instead of small
numbers of people in large amounts.") (citation omitted).
19. "As near as (possible)." BLACK's LAW DicrrsoNARY 349 (5th ed. 1979). Cy pres, borrowed
from the law of trusts, suggests that when direct compensation to the victims of defendant's conduct is
not feasible, the recovery should be distributed in a "next best" fashion-through indirect compensa-
tion (e.g., coupons, merchandise, price reductions, services, advocacy, etc.)-or to a class that is not
identical to the aggrieved class. Colson v. Hilton Hotels, 59 F.R.D. 324, 326 (N.D. I11. 1972) (exam-
ple of "fluid class" concept: compensating current hotel users if past users cannot feasibly be
compensated).
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I. GOALS FOR SMALL CLAIM CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS
Consider the goals of a system that seeks to adjudicate small claim con-
sumer class actions. This Note focuses on three goals of fundamental im-
portance to the issue of damage fund distribution: direct compensation,
disgorgement and deterrence, and equity for absentee class members.
These goals provide the basic rationale for cy pres recoveries.
A. Direct Compensation
Class members with valid claims should receive direct compensation;
that is, they are entitled to be made whole. The court assigns a monetary
value to the injury and the victim receives a direct payment for that
amount. In the case of consumer fraud, the defendant's illegal profits orig-
inally belonged to the victims and therefore are returned directly to them.
However, in class actions with very large plaintiff classes and small
individual claims, direct compensation is often not feasible.2" Individual
proofs of claim may be too time-consuming and difficult to administer.2
Or, the costs of locating class members, communicating with them, evalu-
ating their proofs of claim, and distributing payments may be so large
relative to the size of the individual claim as to result in a claim of little
practical compensatory value.2 In other cases, members of the plaintiff
class may be difficult to locate regardless of the resources brought to bear
because the victims may be unaware that they are members of the class.23
For example, if a suit alleged price fixing of a common consumable
household good, many class members might not recall the brand they pur-
chased, when and where they purchased it, or even that they purchased it
at all. In all likelihood, they have long since discarded any proof of
purchase. Similarly, if a suit involved overcharges of pay telephone users,
most class members would be unable to calculate accurately the number of
pay telephone calls they made during the relevant period of time. Al-
though it may be impossible to compensate class members directly in such
a case, it may well be possible to prove defendants' liability to the class.
20. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 385-86, 556 P.2d 755, 758,
134 Cal. Rptr. 393, 396 (1976); see also supra notes 4, 9. Direct compensation may not be feasible in
other types of class actions as well. See infra note 95.
21. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 89 (9th Cir, 1974), discussed supra note 4.
22. Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 Mich. App. 298, 348 N.W.2d 685 (1984), provides an
extreme example of administrative costs that eclipse the claim. Plaintiffs alleged excessive finance
charges on retail installment sales contracts, amounting to 81 million. The court found that it would
cost more than $82 million to determine the class members' individual claims, plus an additional
"enormous expense" for mailings, printing, and processing. Id. at 303, 348 N.W.2d at 688-89. Due
to these costs, the court declined to certify the class.
23. See, e.g., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Slattery, 102 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1939). Despite efforts that
lasted three years, employed as many as 2,000 people at one time, and cost $2.7 million, defend--'t
was still unable to locate class members entitled to refunds totalling $1.69 million. Id. at 61-62.
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The important issue is how to determine the point at which direct com-
pensation is no longer feasible.24 The court must decide what level of ad-
ministrative costs it will allow in a particular case. These costs should be
determined relative to the amount of individual recoveries. Not surpris-
ingly, courts are loathe to commit valuable judicial resources to cases in
which the ratio of administrative costs to the total recovery is so large that
each victim is unlikely to receive meaningful compensation and only the
lawyers prosper.15
B. Disgorgement and Deterrence
Even when it is not feasible to compensate class members directly, the
important public policy goals of disgorgement and deterrence should be
satisfied. It is a basic principle of equity that wrongdoers should not profit
from their wrongdoing.2" Society benefits, even if the victims do not, when
courts devise remedies that force defendants to relinquish ill-gotten gains.
Wrongdoers will be less likely to engage in future illegal acts if the incen-
tive of unjust enrichment is eliminated. If future transgressions-and liti-
gation-can be reduced, then ensuring deterrence is a valuable long-run
application of judicial resources, even in cases where class members can-
not feasibly be compensated directly.
C. Equity for Absentee Class Members
Consumer classes in small claim actions are often characterized by a
large percentage of absentees.2 Modern market strategies target many
millions of consumers at once; a single marketplace abuse may therefore
injure a very large number of people.2" Current law, however, provides no
relief to a victim who is not identified to the court, or who cannot or will
not come forward to prove a claim. When the court can infer the existence
of these injured individuals from the evidence and can calculate the aggre-
gate amount of claims, the class action device ought to permit satisfaction
of the claims.
A free-market, competitive economy encourages marketplace fraud as a
24. See infra Section IV.A. & B.
25. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 91-92 (9th Cir. 1974). Nonetheless, courts should
consider the consequences of declining to permit an action to go forward because of high administra-
tive costs. Refusal to bear these costs is tantamount to denial of the claim, however meritorious it
might be, when individual claims are so small that no alternative for prosecuting the claim exists
outside the class action device.
26, RISrATEMENT OF R.=sF-rtroN § 3 (1937).
27. Absentees are individuals who have been injured by a defendant's conduct and fall within the
class definition contained in the complaint, but who remain anonymous and uninvolved in the litiga-
tion because it is unfeasible or impossible to identify them, or because sufficient efforts to identify
them have not been undertaken.
28. See supra note 7.
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viable profit source when the legal system limits the remedies available to
the victims. In an economy in which anonymous transactions are very
common, a class action recovery mechanism that compensates only identi-
fiable victims and ignores absentee victims encourages abuse. The likeli-
hood that the defendant will profit from its wrongdoing-even if it gets
caught 29-constitutes a significant hidden cost to society of disregarding
claims of absentee class members.
Further, equity demands that the recovery of one victim should not un-
reasonably be given priority over that of another. Compensation of identi-
fiable claimants should not be so costly as effectively to foreclose the pros-
pects of even alternative recovery by absentee claimants. Absenteeism does
not necessarily suggest a less serious injuryor even an ambivalent atti-
tude towards pressing a claim. Often, absenteeism is simply a result of not
receiving one's mail, not reading newspapers,3" lack of understanding of
one's legal rights, 1 faulty memory, failure to retain sales receipts and
other supporting documents,32 or the economics of very small individual
claims that justify only minimal individual effort.3" From the perspectives
of both the victims and society as a whole, the losses of absentees are no
less serious than the losses of named and readily identifiable plaintiffs. All
injuries deserve the same equitable resolution.
II. CHOOSING AMONG CY PRES OPTIONS
The above three goals provide the foundation for cy pres recoveries.
Complete disgorgement-which includes the illegal gains from absen-
tees-requires aggregation of class-wide damages. Once the court forces
the defendant to disgorge this amount, the court must determine what to
do with the money when direct compensation is not feasible. Unless the
recovery fund is literally burned, its benefit must accrue to someone.
Equity suggests that, as nearly as possible, the benefit should accrue to the
injured, including the absentees.3 4 When it is impossible to do this di-
rectly, it should be done indirectly, with the goal of providing at least
29. See, e.g., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1974), discussed supra note 4.
30. See 2 H. NEWBER;, supra note 5, § 8.24 (mail and publication in press are common methods
of class notification).
31. See Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1234-36 (1982) (poten-
tial class members unable to understand meaning of notices).
32. See State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 471-72, 715 P.2d 564, 570, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 611 (1986) ("ICionsumers are not likely to retain records of small purchases for long periods of
time.").
33. Id. ("Each individual's recovery may be too small to make traditional methods of proof
worthwhile.").
34. See RESTAIEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 910 (1977).
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some significant benefit to the class. This is the concept of cy pres, as
applied to class actions.3 5
Once the court, in its discretion, 6 determines that a "next best" recov-
ery is the only practical way to achieve the above goals, the court must
determine what the next best option is. It should begin by identifying the
criteria by which various options should be evaluated.37 Generally, these
criteria track the previous discussion. First, any "next best" recovery
mechanism should seek to compensate the class as directly and accurately
as possible.3 8 Over- and under-compensation should be avoided. The pos-
sibility of leaving a portion of the class out of the recovery, or allowing
non-members to share in the recovery, should be minimized. Second, ad-
ministrative and adjudicative costs should be minimized. 9 Holding down
these costs conserves judicial resources and allows greater benefit to accrue
to the injured class. Third, defendants should completely disgorge any ille-
gal gain. Complete disgorgement deters future violations. Fourth, private
attorney general actions-lawsuits brought by private citizens to enforce
statutes that the government has enacted as sound policy, but is unable or
unwilling to enforce vigorously-should be encouraged.40 Adequate recov-
ery funds and fee awards provide motivation for claimants and attorneys,
respectively."' In addition, this fourth criterion favors applications of the
recovery fund that empower class members to press claims and assert
rights on their own behalf in a variety of matters consistent with statutory
policy.42 This, in turn, promotes the goals of compensation, disgorgement
and deterrence. Finally, as noted above,43 intra-class equities should be
35. See generally Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI.
L. RE:v. 448, 452-53 (1972) (describing cy pres doctrine as applied to class actions).
36. For a legislative proposal to guide the courts' exercise of this discretion, see infra Section IV.
37. See, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 473, 715 P.2d 564, 571, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 612 (1986).
38. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(goal of distribution is to "assure acceptable targeting of limited settlement funds").
39. Id. ("Transaction costs ... must be kept to a minimum.").
40. See generally Note, Important Rights and the Private Attorney General Doctrine, 73 CALIF.
L. R 'v. 1929, 1929-30 (1985) (describing private attorney general paradigm).
41. See Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 147-48 (5th Cir. 1971) (attorney fees
awarded to encourage private attorney general enforcement of housing anti-discrimination statute);
Tenants and Owners in Opposition to Redevelopment v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 406 F.Supp. 1060, 1064 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (award of attorney fees based on private attorney
general doctrine). See generally Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest Litigation, 48 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 301 (1973) (discussing importance of attorney fee awards to encourage public interest
litigation).
42. For example, in Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d at 147-48, the court held that
"Itihe policy against discrimination in the sale or rental of property ... depends entirely on private
enforcement," and therefore an award of attorney fees for plaintiffs was warranted "[tlo ensure that
individual litigants are willing to act as 'private attorneys general' to effectuate the public purposes of
the statute . . . ." In the same way, a class action recovery fund could be applied to provide private
attorney general enforcement of statutory policy.
43. See supra Section I.C.
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preserved; that is, the rights of absentee class members should not be sub-
ordinated to those of identifiable plaintiffs.
Courts have attempted various cy pres remedies in mass consumer class
actions, but measured against these criteria, they fall short.
A. Price Mechanism
One option is to recoup plaintiffs' losses by forcing the defendant to
reduce the price of its consumer goods for a specified period. A "price
mechanism"44 of this sort both compensates consumer class members and
also serves the goals of disgorgement and deterrence. However, circum-
stances are rare in which courts can successfully apply this mechanism. In
an ordinary market,45 for instance, the court-ordered price reduction may
drive up the number of units sold by the defendant, thereby diluting the
intended disgorgement and deterrence effects. 6 The price reduction would
force competitors to either lower prices or lose market shares.4 The price
mechanism may be useful, however, in a monopolistic market where there
are no competitors to be affected by the market distortions. Yet even in
44. See Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (settlement agreement in
antitrust action in which 500 hotel room rate reduction credited to future guests); Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (odd-lot fee differential price reduction proposed), rev'd,
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (cab fares reduced to compensate for
previous overcharges) (settlement described in 2 H. NEwBE.R(;, supra note 5, § 11.20, at 416 n.60);
Feldman v. Quick Quality Restaurants, N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1983, at 12, col. 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y.
County, July 15, 1983) (class certification) (coupons for free food distributed by fast food restaurant
in consumer fraud action) (settlement described in 3 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 13.46, at 90)
(consent order on file with author).
45. This assumes a market in which there is some competition, but even after the court-ordered
price reduction, the price is above marginal cost.
46. See State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 473-74, 715 P.2d 564, 572, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 613 (1980) (decrease in price will increase defendant's market share to detriment of competitors).
See generally Note, An Economic Analysis of Fluid Class Recovery Mechanisms, 34 STAN. L. REV.
173, 186-200 (1981) (indicating deficiencies of price mechanism form of fluid class recovery). Using
other types of price mechanisms to adjust for this increase in sales will result in related problems. For
instance, a market distribution mechanism that involves special rebates, paid for by the defendant and
given to customers of defendant's competitors, would succeed in depriving the defendant of any market
benefits from a lowered price. The defendant would then either lower its price or lose market share.
All purchasers, whether victims of the defendant's fraud or not, would benefit from the distribution.
Further, price mechanisms could alter consumers' buying habits and loyalties and thus have a long-
term skewing effect on the market. The result could be a detrimental impact on the defendant in
excess of its liability under the lawsuit. Such a program would likely have significant administrative
costs as well.
Another problem with the price mechanism is that consumers will "compete" to purchase the goods
at the lower price. They will be willing to stand in lines and travel longer distances to take advantage
of the reduced price. These inconvenience costs will mount until they equal the price reduction. Thus,
consumers will receive no real benefit. Id. at 189-90.
47. This adverse effect on competitors would also occur in a perfectly competitive market (i.e.,
price equals marginal cost). The price mechanism would force the price below marginal cost. To
minimize loss, the defendant would decrease production. If the court mandated output sufficient to
meet demand, innocent competitors would be forced to lower prices or suffer reduced sales.
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this situation there is a danger that, as a result of the price reduction,
defendant's goods or services will diminish in quality, denying the con-
sumer any real benefit. This is avoided only if the court or an administra-
tive agency is able to control for reductions in quality.
Another difficulty with the price mechanism is the imperfect "fit" be-
tween the injured class and the class benefitting from the recovery. Next
year's buyers of a given commodity may not be identical to last year's
buyers."8 Finally, monitoring costs of the price mechanism will vary with
the circumstances, but will likely be considerable.
B. Escheat to the Government
Distribution of the recovery fund to the government is another option."9
Escheat is attractive because it achieves full disgorgement with very low
administrative costs. The problem is that government use of the funds, as
part of general welfare allocations, results in a benefit to a class far larger
than the class of people actually injured by defendant's conduct.5" Any
direct benefit to injured class members may be trivial.
Even if the court were to require use of the escheated funds for a par-
ticular purpose selected to coincide with the interests of the plaintiff
class, 51 problems remain. First, if the project is also supported by budget
allocations from the legislature, there is nothing to prevent the legislature
from scaling back its own allocations in an amount equal to the escheat.
Second, it is conceivable that the court might order a use of the funds that
contradicts the legislative will.5" This would raise serious separation of
powers concerns.
48. This is particularly true when the commodity is a relatively expensive durable good such as
an automobile or an appliance, since consumers purchase these items only rarely. One possible solu-
tion is to attach the price mechanism to recurring costs related to these items, such as service, replace-
ment parts, or accessories. The problem of potential long-term changes in consumers' buying habits
and loyalties remains, however.
49. See, e.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984) (unclaimed
portion of price fixing suit recovery fund escheats to federal government); Hansen v. United States,
340 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1965) (unclaimed balance of recovery fund in rent control suit remains in U.S.
Treasury account); Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, No. 73-162 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 1982) (unclaimed bal-
ance of common fund for class of mental patients escheats to state).
50. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d at 475, 715 P.2d at 572, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 613.
51. See, e.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd, 440
F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1971) (antitrust settlement on behalf of pharmaceutical consumers in which un-
claimed balance of recovery fund given to states for public health uses).
52. This potential for conflict is demonstrated in Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982), a class action brought on behalf of consumers improperly denied
emergency energy relief funds. The court approved a settlement that required a cy pres application of
a damage fund to be administered by the same government agency that was the defendant in the
action. The money was to fund a variety of energy relief programs-programs that Congress had
recently decided to cease funding. The settlement approval was overturned due to this apparent con-
flict with legislative policy. Simer v. Olivarez, No. 79 C 3960, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 29, 1980).
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C. Claimant Fund Sharing
A third option is claimant fund sharing, that is, dividing the aggregate
damages pro rata among identifiable class members.5" This approach, too,
succeeds in deterring and disgorging, but its compensatory approach is
equitable only when one can expect all but an insignificant number of
class members to come forward to share in the recovery. Absentees receive
no recovery whatsoever. Further, to the extent that absentees fail to re-
cover, class members who do step forward are over-compensated. This
method is particularly ill-suited to class actions involving small individual
claims, since a large number of absentees is expected.
III. THE EQUITABLE TRUST
This Note argues that the best option for most small claim consumer
class actions is a single, class-wide distribution. Courts can avoid piece-
meal recoveries and individual proofs of claim by allowing the fund to
remain in a concentrated lump. Courts also avoid the administrative costs
inherent in individual disbursements. Disgorgement is complete. Intra-
class inequities are avoided since no disproportionate share of the recovery
is spent administering any individual recoveries, and all class mem-
bers-including absentees-share equally in the recovery. A class-wide
recovery has intuitive appeal: a group of individuals is injured by the
same illegal act, they assert their legal rights as a class, they prove defend-
ant's liability to the class; it is hardly inconsistent that they receive their
recovery as a class.
This class-wide distribution should take the form of an equitable trust
designed to benefit the injured class. For example, in Vasquez v. Avco
Financial Services,54 a class action alleging excessive interest rates on re-
tail installment sales loans, the bulk of the recovery fund was placed in
trust with a consumer organization to fund advocacy, research, and educa-
tion regarding consumer credit transactions-all on behalf of consumers.55
Thus, recoveries from class actions can be applied toward such beneficial
activities as administrative intervention before regulatory agencies, lobby-
ing on key consumer issues before legislative bodies, funding for enforce-
ment actions of state and federal consumer protection statutes, research
and educational activities around health and safety issues, and consumer
product testing.
53. See, e.g., Beecher v. Able, 575 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1978) (federal securities violations); Stewart
v. General Motors Corp., 542 F.2d 445, 452-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (race discrimination in hiring and
promotion); Phemister v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., No. 77 C 39 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 14, 1984)
(Sherman Act violations regarding bar review business).
54. No. NCC 11933B (Super. Ct., Los Angeles, Sept. 23, 1975).
55. Id. (Order Re Cy Pres Remedy, Attorney's Fees and Costs, filed April 24, 1984).
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Strong policy considerations particularly favor creation of equitable
trusts in consumer class actions in which individual disbursements, were
they attempted, would be so small as to be of trivial56 value to class mem-
bers. 17 When aggregated into a large fund, trivial amounts of money are
capable of conferring benefits upon class members that are not at all triv-
ial. 8 For example, what would be spare change in the pockets of utility
consumers, if aggregated into a central, class-wide fund, could provide ad-
56. "Trivial" here means an amount so small that the claimant is indifferent to collection. This
refers only to indifference regarding the amount of the claim; claimants might not be indifferent to
recovery out of a concern with punishment, disgorgement, or deterrence, or simply a desire to vindi-
cate their claims. Of course, this notion of triviality is relative to the claimant's wealth.
57. There are two situations in which individual recoveries are of trivial value. The irst involves
cases in which the injury is significant, but the cost of administering direct compensation would burn
up all but an extremely small portion of the recovery. For example, in State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41
Cal. 3d 460, 464, 715 P.2d 564, 565, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 606 (1986), the damages per pair of jeans
were only 35 to 40 cents after administrative costs were deducted. In Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 132 Mich. App. 298, 348 N.W.2d 685 (1984), a case involving excessive finance charges on
credit sales agreements, the court refused to certify the class, citing likely per claim administrative
costs of up to seventeen-and-one-half times the average claim. Id. at 303, 348 N.W.2d at 688-89. A
single, class-wide recovery is appropriate in these circumstances because class members who lose
something of value at the hands of the defendant deserve something of value in return. An indirect
recovery of significant value is preferable to a direct recovery of insignificant value.
Second, the magnitude of an injury may be so slight that only trivial relief is justified. For example,
price fixing, misrepresentation, defect, or fraud on inexpensive consumer goods might yield an ex-
tremely large plaintiff class with very small individual injuries, ranging from a few cents to several
dollars. See supra note 10. Here, an equitable trust is also warranted. Basic principles of economic
efficiency favor using the recovery fund to confer significant benefits on the plaintiff class. Scarce
judicial resources encourage maximization of participants' return from each judicial dollar expended.
It is this nontrivial benefit that provides incentives to challenge marketplace abuses in the first place.
In many cases, these benefits, even if nontrivial, are still small enough to warrant very little effort by
individual consumers to prosecute these claims. Most often, the attorney, spurred on by potential fees
that are nontrivial indeed, has the incentive to prosecute small claim mass consumer class actions.
Still, it is important to ensure that significant benefits accrue to class members for at least two reasons:
First, without it, there would be nothing other than moral indignation to justify even minimal cooper-
ation by consumers with the "crusading" attorney; and second, it adds at least a veneer of respectabil-
ity to what would otherwise be an unseemly legal spectacle-a massive lawsuit on behalf of a huge
class that will receive no meaningful benefits.
The concern is not only with trivial direct compensation, but also with any type of trivial individual
disbursement, even if cy pres in nature. The point is that a particular type of cy pres recovery, one
involving a single, lump-sum class-wide disbursement, is preferable to individual disbursements. For
examples of class action recoveries of dubious value, see Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher
Foods, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 1, 5 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (supermarket price fixing case in which class mem-
bers received one dollar food coupons usable at rate of two coupons in each of ten consecutive six-
month periods; unclaimed coupons were donated to the poor); Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59
F.R.D. 324 (N.D. I1. 1972) (fee opinion) (hotel room rates were temporarily reduced by 500 per
night); Grossman v. Playboy Clubs Int'l, Civil No. 882,939 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1969) (class members
received token worth S8 in Playboy Clubs), cited in 2 H. NF.WBERG, supra note 5, §§ 11.45, 12.05.
58. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In
justifying its decision to approve a distribution plan that allocated one-quarter of a $180 million
settlement fund to create a class assistance foundation, the court said:
Distribution of thousands of small individual payments would trivialize the beneficial impact
of the settlement fund on the needs of the class. . . . Because the foundation will direct the
spending of a large pool of money to fund services, it will have a greater impact on the
problems of the class than if thousands of small, individual payments were made.
Id. at 1431-32.
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vocacy before state public utility commissions to secure lower utility rates,
more favorable pricing structures, or better service-all tangible, substan-
tial benefits for these consumers. Alternatively, the recovery fund might be
used for research, development and testing of new energy-conservation
techniques capable of saving each consumer hundreds of dollars."9
Establishing an ongoing institution 0 designed to provide benefits over
time is preferable to providing class members with a one-time disburse-
ment of relatively worthless sums. This is particularly true when one con-
siders that the use of the fund can be tailored to mirror the same policy
objectives as the statute or common law doctrine under which the action
was brought.6" The ongoing social benefits of deterrence alone justify this
application of the recovery fund.
A. Structuring an Equitable Trust
Once defendant's liability has been established and aggregate damages
determined, the court should solicit-from a special master, the parties, or
other interested individuals-proposals regarding the structure and appli-
cation of the equitable trust. The court will either select a plan or draft
one of its own and enter an order describing the plan in detail.62 This
59. The positive value ascribed to these activities may be largely subjective; courts will have to
make some difficult value choices in creating equitable trusts. As described infra at note 68, these
judgments should not be made in an arbitrary, paternalistic fashion. Class surveys, expert witnesses,
demographic studies, input from named plaintiffs and class counsel, and other methods may assist the
court in determining the value of various applications of the recovery fund.
60. This ongoing institution need not exist in perpetuity, nor even over a period of many years. It
should, however, be capable of conferring a sustained benefit over time, rather than a mere one-time
disbursement of very small amounts.
61. For example, the recovery fund from a class action alleging price fixing might be used to
uncover and prosecute similar pricing violations in the marketplace. Courts have an obligation to
design remedies that further statutory policy objectives. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433
(1964).
62. Although they involve a settlement, two opinions by Judge Weinstein in the "Agent Orange"
case provide an excellent example of how a court can structure an equitable trust. In May 1984, a
settlement was reached in a class action suit on behalf of Vietnam veterans and their family members
against seven chemical companies for injuries allegedly caused by exposure to certain phenoxy herbi-
cides used in Vietnam. In his opinion approving the $180 million settlement, Judge Weinstein offered
a number of suggestions for the parties to consider in recommending distribution plans to the court. In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 858-62 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). These suggestions
included using the recovery fund to provide: (a) partial direct compensation for veterans suffering
adverse health effects; (b) legal and political advocacy on behalf of Vietnam veterans; (c) genetic and
family counseling programs; and (d) assistance to class members' children with birth defects. Id. at
858-61. In addition, the court stressed that transaction costs should be minimized, class members
should have substantial representation on any governing bodies overseeing the expenditure of funds,
and a separate distribution plan should be developed for a subclass of Australian and New Zealand
veterans. Id. at 858-59. In a subsequent opinion, the court accepted the proposal of the special master
that combined direct compensation and an equitable trust in a single plan. In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). Three-quarters of the settlement fund was
earmarked for direct payments to class members who suffered death or total disability due to "Agent
Orange" exposure. Id. at 1410. The court allocated most of the remaining funds to create a class
assistance foundation to "serve many purposes" including providing "a national focus for Vietnam
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order will govern the actions of those ultimately selected to administer the
trust.
The court may design consumer trusts either to provide services 3 to
class members or to advocate their interests. 4 Service-oriented trusts stress
compensatory principles; those providing advocacy (whether legislative,
administrative, or legal) serve principles of deterrence as well, by empow-
ering the plaintiff class. Advocacy trusts promote important public policy
goals by functioning as "private attorneys general" to strengthen enforce-
ment of statutes and to discourage predatory market practices, toxic chem-
ical exposures, defective products, or other commercial harms at issue. Ad-
vocacy-oriented trusts are analogous to class actions in that a visible few
actively assert the rights of all others similarly situated.
The mandated use of the recovery fund should be narrowly drawn to
ensure the most accurate "fit" with the interests of the class. As with all
fluid recoveries, imperfections will almost certainly appear, the most com-
mon being over-inclusiveness-some consumers may benefit from the trust
even though they were not injured by defendant's action. To the extent
that these "free-riders" benefit because their interests happen to coincide
with the interests of the class members served by the fund, this is of only
veterans who are class members to mobilize themselves and others to deal with their medical and
related problems .... In addition, the foundation will provide class members with leverage in seeking
to make public and private institutions more responsive to the medical problems of the class." Id. at
1432. The funds allocated to the foundation were to be divided between two uses: aiding children with
birth defects; and providing legal and social service projects to meet the needs of the class as a whole.
Id. The court specified that the foundation would be "a funding rather than service organization" in
that it would provide, on a grant or contract basis, funding to other organizations that would provide
services directly to class members. Id. at 1433. The court would appoint the initial board of directors,
which would have between 15 and 45 members and would be comprised primarily of Vietnam veter-
ans. Id. at 1434. The board, with the involvement of an experienced executive director, would define
the foundation's funding priorities, submit annual audits and reports to the court for review, solicit
and evaluate grant applications and contract offers, and in general "control every aspect of foundation
administration." Id. at 1435. While the board would act on a fully independent basis, the court would
retain jurisdiction over the endowment until all funds have been disbursed. In April, 1987, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit struck down several aspects of the settlement, including the founda-
tion mechanism. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 86-3039, -3042, -6171, -6173,
-6174, slip op. 2523, 2534-38 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1987). The court found no fault with setting aside a
portion of the proceeds from a settlement for programs designed to assist the class as a whole. Id. at
2536. However, it was concerned that in this case the foundation had been granted too much indepen-
dence; the court believed that increased judicial supervision was necessary. Id. at 2536-37. The court
also indicated that it viewed political advocacy to be an inappropriate use of court-administered settle-
ment funds. Id. at 2537-38.
63. For example, consumer trusts could be established to weatherize homes, conduct product test-
ing, offer financial counseling, provide information on prices and quality of competing brands of con-
sumer goods, or educate consumers about their legal and administrative rights and remedies.
64. For example, consumer trusts might be designed to represent consumers in proceedings before
state insurance commissioners, professional licensing boards, air and water quality boards, and landfill
and hazardous waste siting panels. Consumer trusts might lobby Congress, state legislatures, and city
councils to expand health and safety programs, strengthen housing standards, or streamline small
claims court procedures. Consumer trusts might also provide legal representation to individual con-
sumers or classes of consumers.
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minor concern; the benefits to class members from advocacy, research, or
public education, for example, are not necessarily diminished 5 because
they are delivered in an over-inclusive fashion.66
Of more concern is a use of the recovery fund that is either under-
inclusive (some class members do not share in the benefits) or that allows
uneven distribution of benefits (all class members benefit, but some more
than others). The more heterogeneous the class, the more difficult it will
be to identify interests shared by all, increasing the danger of under-inclu-
siveness. Class members do have at least one common interest: They all
participated in an economic transaction that gave rise to the injury.
Under-inclusiveness can therefore be minimized by designing a use for the
recovery fund that relates closely to the event leading to the injury and
that shares the same substantive goals as the statute under which the suit
was brought. Should the problem of uneven benefits persist, the fund
might be divided into more than one use, with each specially tailored to
the needs of the diverse subclasses.8 7 Nonetheless, it would be unduly
optimistic to expect all class members to share in the benefits of the trust
in exactly equal amounts-some unevenness is inevitable. But because eq-
uitable trusts can be tailored to meet the interests of a particular class, 8
their use minimizes the over- and under-inclusiveness that can be exces-
sive in the escheat and claimant fund sharing models, respectively.
65. For a discussion of non-rival public goods, see Silver, Utilitarian Participation, 23 Soc. Sci.
INFO. 701, 711-13 (1984); Snidal, Public Goods, Property Rights, and Political Organizations, 23
INT'l. STUD. Q. 532, 542 (1979).
66. A primary goal of a consumer trust as a recovery mechanism is, obviously, to provide some
compensation to injured class members. If non-class members benefit from the fund as well, this is
simply a bonus created by this particular application of the recovery fund. It is quite another matter
when the free-riders' benefit from the trust results in a reduced benefit to class members. The court's
goal in tailoring the use of the recovery fund is to achieve maximum benefit for class members. Stated
otherwise, the court should allow non-class members to benefit from the recovery only if it determines
that the recovery fund is being applied to afford class members maximum benefit.
67. This approach should be used sparingly, since it creates additional administrative costs and
thereby dilutes the benefits of a single, class-wide disbursement. But see In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (separate treatment for veterans suffering
death or disability, and for Australian and New Zealand claimants).
68. Implicit here is the assumption that the interests of class members can be accurately deter-
mined. The ultimate decision as to what those interests are, and how they should be served by the
recovery fund, belongs to the court. The court will make this decision either in the context of final
judgment or, more likely, in reviewing a proposed settlement. See Developments in the Law-Class
Actions, 89 HARM. L. RFv. 1318, 1373 n.5 (1976). When class members' interests are not evident, the
court may seek more data for its decision. This may involve commissioning a study or soliciting advice
from experts. Surveys administered to samples of identifiable class members might yield input from
individuals who would not otherwise have been sufficiently motivated to come forward. Separate
counsel may be appointed to represent subclasses with idiosyncratic views. And the court will un-
doubtedly permit suggestions by the class counsel and named plaintiffs-those individuals entrusted
under FF~t). R. Civ. P. 23 to represent the interests of the class. These approaches may increase
administrative costs, but, relative to very large class-wide damage funds, not significantly. They
should nonetheless be used prudently, balancing these costs against the costs of administering alterna-
tive damage distribution mechanisms. For a discussion of equitable trust administrative costs, see infra
Section IV.B.
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Once the court has determined and published the goals of the equitable
trust, it must appoint a responsible, visible individual or board of individ-
uals to direct the operations of the trust and to make detailed funding
decisions within the parameters of the court's instructions. One option is
to create a new entity to carry out the work of the trust. The recovery
fund would become its operating budget, and staff would be hired to com-
plete the work. A second option, preferable to the first in terms of avoid-
ing organizational costs, is to place the money in trust with an existing
group experienced in the relevant field.6 9 Non-profit consumer, environ-
mental, neighborhood, and charity organizations are all appropriate recip-
ients. A third option would be to create a foundation that would allocate
the funds as grants to deserving organizations for projects that comply
with guidelines stipulated by the court. The money could be disbursed
over a set period of time, or it could be maintained as an endowment fund
with its earnings allocated on an annual basis."0 This last approach would
have the benefit of creating an entity capable of continuing service, with
the flexibility to reorient the use of the fund 1 as the interests of class
members changed over time.
Monitoring costs create no serious impediment to the use of equitable
trusts.7 2 Before the court's final order is entered, the directors of the trust
would agree to be bound by the limitations placed on the fund by the
court and to act as fiduciaries for class members. The court could retain
jurisdiction over the trust to facilitate corrective measures should this fidu-
ciary duty be violated. The court might require periodic reports and au-
dits to facilitate oversight,7 3 or even commission an independent evaluation
of the workings of the trust.74 The very nature of the trust ensures that its
69. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 475, 715 P.2d 564, 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 614
(1986). The court warned against possible conflicts of interest created when an organization views a
recovery as a source of funding for "projects ranked high on [its] own agenda but of little or no benefit
to the class." Id. at n.l .
70. Where the court chooses to place the funds in trust with an existing organization, the board of
directors of the trust would probably be the directors or staff of the existing group. Where the court
chooses to create a new organization or endowment, the board members should be chosen with an eye
towards either particular expertise in the field of application or credentials that indicate an ability to
represent particular interests of class members. The group might include community leaders, named
plaintiffs, or class counsel. As with any fiduciary relationship, it is important to avoid conflicts of
interest in appointing this board. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at
1434-35 (board should reflect cross-section of Vietnam veteran community).
71. Any reorientation of the use of the fund would have to be within the parameters of the origi-
nal court order. Any more extensive change would require approval from the court.
72. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. at 1436 ("A comparatively modest
supervisory role in the operation of the class assistance foundation will [be satisfactory].").
73. Id. ("The board will submit detailed annual budgets, biannual budgetary status reports, and
biannual financial and investment statements to the court for review.").
74. Because class members may not have a sufficient economic interest in the trust to provide
monitoring, there may be some concern that no one will call the court's attention to misuse of the
fund. Reporting and auditing requirements should be designed with this in mind. This concern, how-
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operation would be highly visible and subject to the scrutiny of class mem-
bers and the public.
B. Expanding the Use of Equitable Trusts
The equitable trust has achieved a judicial acceptance that is, at best,
mixed. Although no court has created a consumer trust as part of a final
judgment in a class action, several have approved settlements that include
equitable trust provisions.75 There are ample cases that offer the opposite
ever, may be unfounded, as the size and public nature of the fund will encourage oversight by the
press, governmental authorities, and class members themselves-motivated less by concern over any
personal economic stake than by moral indignation at corruption, incompetence, or institutional
failure.
75. California has proved the most fertile ground for consumer trusts. Five years ago, a state
appellate court overturned a lower court ruling striking the portion of plaintiffs' complaint seeking a
cy pres recovery (either a price mechanism or an earmarked escheat was requested). The case, Bruno
v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1981), was a private antitrust suit on
behalf of between I and 1.5 million consumers, charging three supermarkets with fixing milk prices.
The appellate court held that, depending on the intent of the substantive law and the circumstances of
the case, a cy pres recovery might be appropriate.
Encouraged by this ruling, a California court approved a settlement in a 1984 case creating a
prototype consumer trust. Vasquez v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. NCC 11933B (Super. Ct., Los Angeles,
Sept. 23, 1975) (settlement approval entered April 24, 1984), involved a class action on behalf of
90,000 consumers alleging excessive interest rates on retail installment sales loans. At the suggestion
of an intervenor, the California Department of Consumer Affairs, the parties agreed that any portion
of the recovery fund that could not be reimbursed to injured consumers would be placed in trust with
Consumers Union, a non-profit consumer advocacy organization. These funds were designated for a
wide range of activities to benefit class members who did not receive a refund, including administra-
tive, legislative, and legal advocacy; and research, education, and direct service projects. Consumers
Union was directed to use part of the fund to review the problems and needs of low- and moderate-
income people in California regarding consumer credit transactions, consumer financial issues, and
other related matters. Consumers Union received nearly $325,000 on behalf of members of the class
who could not be identified. Later, another $1 million was placed in the trust representing checks sent
to consumers that were returned uncashed or undeliverable. The trust fund is administered under the
supervision of a fifteen member Advisory Council.
State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1986), is another
case in which an intervenor requested the creation of a trust. Levi Strauss & Co. was charged with
fixing prices on mens' and boys' jeans sold in California from 1972 to 1975. The parties settled the
case for $12.25 million, to be distributed through a lenient claims procedure following a direct mail
and media campaign costing $1.8 to 2.2 million and reaching every household in the state. Consumers
Union, as amicus curiae, joined with other citizen groups as intervenors to ask the court to modify the
distribution plan. The intervenors' proposal would have allowed consumers submitting claims to
choose whether to receive a fixed amount (thirty cents per pair of jeans) or allocate it to a consumer
trust. Any unclaimed funds would also be placed in the trust. Amici Curiae Brief of Consumers
Union, et. al., at 46-49, State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605 (1986) (No. S.F. 24,699) (filed May 23, 1984). The intervenors' motion was rejected by the trial
court. On appeal, the California Supreme Court approved the original distribution plan, calling it a
"fait accompli" and noting that $1.5 million of consumers' money had already been spent to adminis-
ter it. 41 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 715 P.2d at 569-70, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11. The court went on to
discuss the merits of using the "residue" of the fund-money remaining after individual distribu-
tions-to establish a consumer trust. The idea, the court concluded, "has considerable merit." Id. at
479, 715 P.2d at 576, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 617. The case is now on remand to the trial court to deter-
mine a plan for the residue of the fund.
Consumer trusts have also gained some acceptance outside California. Part of the $180 million
settlement of In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (approval
of distribution plan), was earmarked for a trust fund to provide social services and advocacy for
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view, however, rejecting the use of cy pres and fluid class recoveries, 6 or
specifically, equitable trusts. In countless other cases the option was
never considered, although it may have been appropriate. 8
Expanding the use of equitable trusts in small claim consumer class
actions requires analysis of the objections commonly raised to their appli-
cation. The first, and possibly least problematic objection, is the claim that
aggregating class-wide damages deprives the defendant of due process
rights to challenge individual damage claims. 9 To the extent that the de-
fendant has defenses to assert against certain class members, this claim is
probably valid. But with respect to aggregating the claims of similarly
situated class members, due process does not require adjudication of each
claim individually. Defendant's access to full procedural rights in a single
trial to determine the aggregate class-wide damages is sufficient.80 Thus,
defendant has ample opportunity to challenge any alleged double-recov-
Vietnam veterans who were exposed to "Agent Orange." The trust was also designed to fund projects
to aid children with birth defects born to these veterans. On appeal, the trust was struck down for
inadequate judicial supervision. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., Nos. 86-3039, -3042,
-6171, -6173, -6174, slip op. 2523, 2534-38 (2d Cir. Apr. 21, 1987). See supra note 62.
In Bebchick v. Public Util. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963),
the court struck down an improper transit fare increase. Although not a class action, the court ruled
that the overcharges should be utilized for the benefit of the entire injured class. The court established
a fund administered by the Public Utilities Commission on behalf of transit users.
76. E.g., Windham v. American Brands, 565 F.2d 59, 66 (4th Cir. 1977) (Sherman Act viola-
tion); Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1977) (breach of contract with
convertible debenture holders); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90-91 (9th Cir. 1974) (con-
spiracy to inflate hotel charges); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973)
(Securities Exchange Act violation), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974);
Reader v. Magma-Superior Copper Co., 110 Ariz. 115, 116, 515 P.2d 860, 861 (1973) (damages
sought against owners of copper smelters for polluting air); Lucas v. Pioneer, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 167,
179 (Iowa 1977) (damages sought against producers of defective seed corn).
77. E.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984) (price fixing);
Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982) (denial of emergency
energy relief funds); Cicelski v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 132 Mich. App. 298, 348 N.W.2d 685 (1984)
(miscalculation of department store finance charges).
78. E.g., In re Cuisinart Food Processor Antitrust Litig., 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 65,680
(D. Conn. 1983) (price fixing); Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 59 F.R.D. 324 (N.D. II. 1972)
(illegal telephone charges on hotel room bills); Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381,
556 P.2d 755, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976) (excess sales tax charges).
79. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). "Even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any
such fantastic procedure [as fluid recovery], the courts would have to reject it as an unconstitutional
violation of the requirement of due process of law." Id. at 1018.
80. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 68, at 1524-25; Comment, Due
Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 OR. L. REv. 225, 236-37 (1974); Recent Developments, Eisen
111: Fluid Recoveiy, Constructive Notice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in Class Action
Rejected, 73 COI.UM. L. REv. 1641, 1648-49 (1973). Subsequent courts' rejection of the Eisen due
process concern is implicit in their use of class-wide damage aggregation. See, e.g., Van Gemert v.
Boeing Co., 590 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1978) (securities case in which damages were aggregated through
use of formula multiplying difference in stock price by number of shares at issue), affd, 444 U.S. 472
(1980); Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978) (bank's computer records used to
calculate class-wide damages), affd on other grounds sub nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper,
445 U.S. 326 (1980).
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cries on the part of individual class members that would inflate the aggre-
gate class-wide damages. Further, limiting defendants to a single hearing
on aggregate damages can be no more violative of due process than collat-
eral estoppel, which would ultimately have the same effect if hearings for
determination of each class member's damages were required."'
A second objection is the claim that this type of cy pres distribution
violates Rule 2382 and the Rules Enabling Act 3 by violating the ban on
altering substantive rights.8 4 Alone, this claim is not dispositive. Courts
must first analyze the specific substantive rights of the parties under the
statute invoked to determine whether they have been altered by this appli-
cation of Rule 23. When plaintiffs sue under statutes drawn to serve prin-
ciples of deterrence and disgorgement, it is difficult to argue that applica-
tion of an equitable trust, which accomplishes these goals, conflicts with
the Rules Enabling Act by altering the parties' substantive rights. How-
ever, if plaintiffs invoke statutes drawn explicitly to provide compensation
to a narrow range of injured parties, a conflict may result. Since the goals
of deterrence, disgorgement and compensation are usually inher-
ent-albeit in varying proportions-in most statutes relevant to the con-
sumer class actions discussed here, the analysis becomes complex. The
court must determine the strength and clarity of the legislative concern for
each of these goals to evaluate the appropriateness of cy pres distributions.
Legislatures can facilitate this judicial inquiry by recognizing that ex-
plicit attention to only the compensatory function of a statute may, in the
class action remedy context, eclipse any real but unstated concern with
deterrence and disgorgement. The result, as we have seen, may be an in-
surmountable barrier to the use of Rule 23 to correct the statutorily recog-
nized wrong, at least when the individual claims are relatively small. In
the end, even the goal of compensation is not achieved. To ensure that the
statute will provide full protection, the legislature must explicitly recog-
nize, in both the legislative history and the statutory language itself, the
goals of deterrence and disgorgement. While this is easy enough for future
legislative action, it is cumbersome, and perhaps fraught with political
barriers, to amend existing consumer protection statutes already enacted.
Yet this may be the only way to allow cy pres remedies to be applied,
thereby guaranteeing fair application of these statutory protections to all
meritorious claims.
81. See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra note 68, at 1525.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
84. See In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974); Eisen, 479 F.2d at 1014; see
also Simon, supra note 2. But see 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 5, § 10.22, at 386 ("Cy pres is a
substantive law principle. It is not a procedural rule that would be barred from enlarging, modifying,
or abridging substantive rights, contrary to the Rules Enabling Act.").
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The courts can respond to this objection as well, by designing cy pres
remedies with particular care. The crux of the criticism is that these rem-
edies are insufficiently compensatory in nature to satisfy statutes that are
explicitly compensation-oriented. In "gray area" cases in which the stat-
ute expresses a mix of compensatory and deterrent/disgorgement goals,
the court should be particularly careful in framing the use of the trust
fund. To the extent that the use of the fund is tailored to benefit class
members only, and each to a degree commensurate with his or her injury,
its compensatory nature is emphasized. Only when there is significant va-
riance between this alternative application of the recovery fund and indi-
vidual disbursements is the critic's claim strengthened. Special efforts by
the courts to determine the best application of the fund-surveys, experts,
subclassing, and other methods-will be crucial in meeting this concern.
A third objection to the use of equitable trusts is the claim that the
judiciary enjoys too much discretion already, and that equitable trust rem-
edies would further expand this discretion.8 5 In the class action context,
judicial restraint favors the traditional compensation-oriented approach,
which, we have seen, often serves to extinguish the recovery prospects of
class members with small individual claims. The legislature can overcome
this objection by enacting a statute that brands cy pres remedies not
merely an acceptable exercise of judicial discretion,86 but a preferred ex-
ercise when the alternative is a failure to satisfy otherwise valid claims of
class members. This requires a bright-line rule, to be engrafted upon Rule
23, its state law equivalents, or substantive statutes that give rise to class-
wide causes of action. The rule would set standards to trigger the use of cy
pres when the meritorious claims of class members-with special concern
for absentee class members-might otherwise be imperiled.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY GUIDELINES
In theory at least, there are no insurmountable barriers to expanded use
of equitable trusts. Generally, courts have sufficient discretion under their
equity powers to invoke this alternative remedy. Despite the latitude to
create equitable trusts, in practice courts rarely do. Express legislative
guidance would help overcome this judicial inertia.8 This Note proposes
three major guidelines.
85. Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term-Forward: Public Law Litigation and the Burger
Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 46 (1982).
86. Indeed, the court is no less qualified to determine the best application of the recovery fund
than it is to approve a class action settlement that deviates from the relief originally requested.
87. Two legislative proposals concerning class action recovery procedures merit attention. Neither
adequately meets the concerns raised in this Note. The UNIFORM CLAss ACTIONS ACT, reprinted in
12 U.L.A. 23 (Supp. 1986), adopted in Iowa and North Dakota, fails in two important respects.
First, the Uniform Class Actions Act (UCAA) explicitly invites the court to balance the size of indi-
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A. Direct compensation of individual class members shall be the fa-
vored remedy in class action suits providing it is fair and feasible. If not,
class-wide damages shall be aggregated and a single recovery fund
created.
This guideline preserves the compensation-oriented status quo. I sug-
gest a three-part test to determine when direct compensation, via individ-
ual proofs of claim, is no longer fair or feasible. The first part determines
that a more equitable option does not exist for claimants outside the class
action approach. The second part determines that a class-wide recovery is
possible. And the third part determines that, once the class action route
has been taken, a class-wide distribution is necessary in order to achieve
an equitable recovery for all deserving class members.
1. It is unlikely that class members will prosecute their claims individ-
ually if denied use of the class action mechanism. If the amount or nature
of plaintiffs' claims are such that the court could reasonably believe that
all but an insubstantial number of class members would seek direct com-
pensation through individual actions, then there is no justification for re-
quiring alternative recovery mechanisms. In these cases, noncertification
of the class would be preferable because few individual claims will go
unprosecuted. Our concern is with suits involving monetary claims that
are so small that only the economies of scale provided by the class action
device justify their pursuit.
2. It is possible to calculate the aggregate class-wide damages. In most
cases, access to the defendant's own records is sufficient, and, indeed, the
most accurate method of calculating aggregate class-wide damages. For
instance, in a price-fixing suit charging the defendant with illegally inflat-
ing the price of its product, the defendant's sales figures are likely the only
vidual claims against administrative costs and to consider other management difficulties in deciding
whether to allow the class action to proceed. Id. § 3(11), (13). This is a clear invitation to deny
certification to small claim actions involving large plaintiff classes. Second, the Act requires that all
funds remaining after distribution to identifiable class members escheat to the state. Id. § 15(c)(5).
Thus, absentees would receive no benefit (except a de minimis reduction in taxes), either directly or
through cy pres.
The Federal Consumer Class Action Act, see The Federal Consumer Class Action Act, 4 CLASS
ACrION REr. 342 (1975), proposed in 1976 but never enacted by Congress, avoids at least one of the
UCAA's shortcomings by refusing to allow courts not to certify an action for damages due to manage-
ability difficulties, including problems in distributing any recovery. The statute specifically provides
for class-wide aggregation of damages and a class-wide distribution through cy pres, when appropri-
ate. Id. at 344-45. The problem with this proposed statute is that it is designed only to provide a new
federal cause of action to combat consumer fraud. Thus, its progressive approach to cy pres distribu-
tions is limited to this particular cause of action. Further, it does not adequately protect the interests
of absentees. Before any cy pres distribution is made, the Act requires efforts to identify and compen-
sate individual class members. These efforts are limited to those justified by the probable benefits to be
achieved in compensating individual consumers. Id. at 345. The expense of individual compensation
may be justified from the perspective of those receiving the money, but not from the perspective of the
absentee claimants who must underwrite the effort. The result is a subsidy by the absentees to the
identifiable class members.
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reliable indicator of the total damages. In other cases, it may be necessary
to use statistical sampling or other econometric techniques to arrive at a
reasonably accurate calculation of damages. The courts would be justified
in refusing aggregate recovery only when records are unavailable, and re-
liable estimates are impossible.
3. Either (i) it is reasonably certain that a substantial portion of the
plaintiff class will not present proofs of claim, or (ii) the cost of identify-
ing and compensating individual class members is excessive relative to
the cost of a class-wide distribution. The former criterion could apply
when there is a large pool of unidentified or unidentifiable class members.
Perhaps the small size of the claim provides insufficient economic incen-
tive for individual claimants to come forward; or the nature of the claim
may be such that it is difficult for claimants to provide individual proofs
of claim."B In either case, the controlling principle is that a significant
portion of the class may fail to recover on otherwise valid claims.
The latter criterion focuses on the total cost of identifying individual
class members, communicating with them, adjudicating their claims, and
distributing their recoveries. This concern involves the court's judgment as
to whether administrative costs are too high to insist upon a direct com-
pensation scheme. The feasibility of either approach is ultimately deter-
mined by comparing the administrative costs with the size of the recovery
itself. The court must do more than simply ascertain whether administra-
tive costs are greater for direct compensation than for cy pres; this alone
may not justify applying cy pres. The court must determine if administra-
tive costs are excessive. The costs of the cy pres distribution act as the
much-needed reference point.
B. The class-wide recovery fund shall be used to compensate individ-
ual claimants as appropriate, but only to the extent that doing so does
not sacrifice the interests of absentee class members; the remainder of the
fund shall be distributed through cy pres.
Claimants should receive direct compensation when it can be accom-
plished efficiently. Some claimants may deserve individual treatment ei-
ther because their claims are larger than most, justifying greater expense
to administer their distribution, or because these individuals are already
identified, making direct compensation relatively inexpensive. The effi-
ciency rationale which justifies cy pres class-wide distributions does not
apply to these claimants; direct compensation is appropriate.
A problem arises, however, if the recovery of identifiable class members
occurs at the expense of absentee members. Because administrative costs
are generally incurred on a class-wide basis, they are chargeable to the
88. See supra Section I.A.
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entire recovery fund; all class members bear a pro rata share. If identify-
ing and compensating identifiable class members uses up a disproportion-
ate share of the recovery fund, then the recoveries of absentee class mem-
bers are diminished, and the absentee class members are, in effect,
subsidizing the identifiable members.
How should the court determine whether direct compensation to identi-
fiable class members creates this subsidy? Obviously, what is important is
not the total costs spent on each recovery mechanism, but rather a relative
measure of these costs. This is best calculated on a cost per class-member-
recovery basis, or, stated differently, the average administrative expense
each method incurs for each class member who recovers by that method.89
If the cost per class-member-recovery for direct compensation exceeds that
for cy pres, then a subsidy is taking place. Because the administrative ex-
pense of a cy pres recovery is so low, direct compensation will occur rarely
under this test-and only under conditions that render it extraordinarily
efficient (e.g., the claimant has already stepped forward with a claim eas-
ily recognized as valid). The equitable principle of protecting the recov-
eries of absentees, rather than any bias against direct recoveries, justifies
this approach.9"
89. Cost per class-member-recovery is preferable to cost per dollar awarded (i.e., total administra-
tive costs divided by total award dollars disbursed) for three reasons. First, to the extent that the size
of the claim per class member is uniform, there will be no difference between the calculations. Second,
even where the size of the claims are not uniform, a cost per class-member-recovery calculation may
be fairer and more accurate. The administrative costs most frequently at issue here are (a) identifying
and communicating with the member, (b) ascertaining the legitimacy and amount of the claim, and (c)
disbursing compensation. The size of the claim has little or no effect on disbursement costs-it is no
more costly to write a check and do the bookkeeping for a five dollar reimbursement than for a fifty
dollar reimbursement. Since we are interested only in small individual claim litigation, the adminis-
trative costs of ascertaining the legitimacy and amount of the claim will likewise vary only minimally,
if at all, with the size of the claim. The claimant bears any costs of gathering and presenting necessary
proofs of claim, so there is no danger that absentee members will subsidize these costs. The real class-
wide cost here is the expense of setting up a system to adjudicate the legitimacy of the individual
claims. Once the system is set up, the incremental cost of adjudicating fifty dollars of claims over five
dollars of claims is nominal. The cost of identifying and communicating with class members will
likewise be no different for a fifty dollar claimant than for a five dollar claimant. In short, these
administrative costs vary directly with the number of class members participating, not with the size of
their claims.
The third reason why a cost per class-member-recovery method is preferable is self-evident upon
application. The object is to determine when it is appropriate to spend a portion of the recovery fund
to compensate individual members directly. Many of these members will be unidentified at the time
this determination is made. A cost per dollar of recovery calculation would be useless, since one could
not know the amounts of the individual claims without first having identified the members and ascer-
tained the amount of their claims.
90. Society sufficiently values direct compensation that it is willing to incur a disparate cost to
accomplish itlSee In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp 1396, 1410 (E.D.N.Y.
1985) ("Thq' common law generally holds that money damages are a preferred remedy."). This is
reflected in the approach of this Note's Guideline A.3.: It is not enough that the costs of administering
a direct compensation scheme are greater than for cy pres; they must be excessive before cy pres will
be invoked. Nonetheless, it is inappropriate to incur a disproportionate cost to accomplish direct com-
pensation for only some members of the class when the cost is being borne by other class members.
Small claim mass consumer class actions by nature have a very large percentage of absentee class
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It is important to note that under an equitable trust distribution, all
class members can benefit to the same degree. Even though some class
members may avail themselves of the services provided by the trust more
than others, the opportunity to benefit is provided to the class on an equal
basis. As a result, inequities may occur if the claims of class members are
not uniform. For example, if the injury of one claimant is $100 when the
average claim is only $10, a cy pres distribution may undercompensate
that person.9"
There are two ways to address this problem. One approach is to group
larger claims in a subclass for separate treatment-either an entirely sepa-
rate action or a separate recovery fund. It would of course be relatively
expensive to identify these larger claimants among a very larg !cnsumer
class and to administer their recoveries. To the extent that their individual
claims are large enough to justify this expense, this is a viable solution.
Where they are not, grouping them with the smaller, average claimants
may be the lesser of two evils, and the only way of ensuring any recovery.
The second approach is to allow these claimants to recover individually,
but to require them to bear the additional administrative costs. To do
otherwise would force the smaller claimants to subsidize their recoveries.
Only those efforts likely to yield a benefit greater than the sum of these
administrative costs and the value of the cy pres recovery would be justi-
fied. Stated differently, the court should seek to compensate these claim-
ants directly only to the extent that the benefits of direct compensation
minus the unsubsidized costs exceed the benefits of cy pres. The smaller
the individual claim, the less justified direct compensation would be; and
as the claims become larger, individual recoveries would be encouraged.
members. See supra Section I.C. Any recovery mechanism in these cases should be structured to
recognize the absentees' equal right to compensation.
Some may argue that the individuals who actively prosecuted the suit deserve to be compensated
directly to recoup their time and energy costs. This is unrealistic. These are actions to recover on
small individual claims-in most cases so small that full direct compensation will not meaningfully
reward them for their actions. It is safe to assume that these active plaintiffs are motivated by the
more principled goals of deterrence, disgorgement, and class-wide benefit rather than by personal
financial gain.
91. The benefits conferred by a cy pres equitable trust may be disproportionate to the size of
individual contributions to the fund. See supra Section III.A. There are obvious difficulties in valuing
the return on a cy pres distribution, since it is delivered not in financial form, but in services, advo-
cacy, education, increased health and safety, enhanced opportunities, and so on. Nonetheless, the pit-
fall described here is real: A claimant with a substantially larger than average claim may have a
greater interest in a direct distribution of the recovery fund than one with a smaller claim.
This is offset to some degree by a related, mirror-image problem. Any claimant who recovers indi-
vidually may also benefit from the cy pres application of the balance of the fund. This potential
double recovery contributes to the imperfect fit between any cy pres distribution and a fully accurate
direct compensation scheme. However, the nature of the benefit produced by an equitable trust does
not diminish in value to class members because non-deserving individuals also benefit from it. See
supra note 66 and accompanying text. In this sense, the double recovery issue is more cosmetic than
substantive.
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The court would be required to draw on its experience and common sense
in determining where to draw the direct compensation line. 2
C. In devising an appropriate cy pres remedy for the remainder of the
recovery fund, the court shall create an equitable trust to benefit the in-
jured class.93
Of the various cy pres options, the equitable trust is best suited to small
claim consumer class actions. 4 This method of distributing the recovery
fund forces the defendant to disgorge ill-gotten gains, deters future illegal
conduct, and compensates injured class members (although with services
instead of direct payments). This is accomplished fairly and efficiently: all
class members-including absentees-benefit equally, and administrative
costs are minimized.
V. CONCLUSION
Market strategies, once local or regional in nature, now span vast areas
and reach many millions of consumers. As a result, marketplace abuses
today injure millions of consumers at once. Yet our legal system remains
inept at remedying abuses that exact a small toll from a very large num-
ber of people. The judiciary, while capable of responding to this problem,
has generally failed to do so. Legislatures must therefore respond by al-
lowing aggregation of damages, promoting the goals of deterrence and dis-
gorgement in large consumer class actions,95 and encouraging the use of
equitable trust cy pres remedies.
92. This cost-benefit rule of thumb approach is intuitive both in design and application. It is easy
to calculate the benefits of direct compensation because they are defined in dollar terms. But the
benefits of cy pres, as well as the incremental costs of providing direct recovery to these claimants, are
not easily translated into simple dollar terms.
93. Often, courts will need to decide what to do with the residue of funds remaining after at-
tempting to compensate individual class members directly. Particularly when an action has been pend-
ing for a number of years, the amount of funds returned due to lack of current addresses for class
members can be substantial. For greatest efficiency and class-wide benefit, these funds should be
included in an equitable trust. It is important, however, that this is expressly stated in the court's
original order. Otherwise, "undeliverable" funds might be considered abandoned property; most states
have statutes requiring that unclaimed property escheats to the state. See, e.g., CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1510-1528 (West 1982). By indicating an alternative use for these funds to benefit the class, courts
can avoid the possibility of escheat. Alternatively, escheat statutes can be amended to provide that
"unclaimed property" originally allocated as part of a class action distribution shall not escheat to the
state but shall instead be applied by the court to benefit the class through Cy pres.
94. For a discussion of circumstances in which a price mechanism distribution might be appropri-
ate, see supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
95. The focus of this Note is on the application of equitable trusts to a particular species of class
action-those with very large consumer plaintiff classes and involving relatively small individual
claims. This Note does not argue that the only application of equitable trusts is in this type of action.
Indeed, this alternative remedy may be equally well-suited to a variety of class actions in which direct
compensation may be problematic. For example, class suits against polluters may present problems of
calculation of individual damages best resolved through application of an equitable trust. This may
also be the solution to damage award difficulties presented by toxic chemical exposure cases, in which
the victims are virtually unidentifiable due to the delayed nature of the injury. Even consumer class
actions involving relatively large individual claims may present opportunities for creating equitable
trusts which public policy considerations might deem preferable to a direct compensation scheme.
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